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1 
Advancing Understandings  Housing Supply Constraints: Housing Market Recovery and 
Institutional Transitions  British Speculative Housebuilding 
 
Abstract 
The vicissitudes and volatilities of recent housing market cyclicality have restructured, 
reconfigured and reorganised housing systems and their supply demand characteristics. 
Surprisingly little attention has been paid to (re)examining supply side outcomes, much 
less the influencing effect of supply behaviour in response to demand-side change and 
their interactions. Indeed, one of the biggest unanswered questions in housing studies 
today is how supply side characteristics, specifically those of speculative housebuilders, 
have been affected by the turbulent, transitionary context presented by the global 
financial crisis. Addressing the gap, this paper presents a novel analysis of how Britain╆s 
biggest housebuilders respond to significant institutional shock in their operating 
environment and considers how this enables and constrains housing supply outcomes in 
the post-recession context.  
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The deep and widely afflicting global economic crisis of the late 2000s has drawn 
renewed attention to the role that housing, and real estate more broadly, plays in the 
economic and social prosperity of societies (Schatz & Sebastian, 2009). It has exposed 
both the fragility and resilience that underlies diverse and dynamic housing markets and 
has helped turn attention to the often-underplayed contribution of market-facing actors 
and their practices as explanations for housing market outcomes (see Aalbers, 2017). 
Such marks an historic point of significance in rethinking how housing markets operate, 
how we theoretically conceive of contemporary housing systems and what influencing 
effects structural forces and actor agency, and their relations, have in housing supply 
outcomes.  
One of the biggest unanswered questions in housing studies today is how supply side 
characteristics, specifically market-facing actors such as speculative housebuilders, have 
been affected by the turbulent, transitionary context presented by the global financial 
crisis and what their influencing effects are on housing supply outcomes. Indeed, while 
Yates & Berry (2011) highlight the challenges for housing policy makers in being faced 
with the ╅wicked problem╆ of responding to the unexpected, unknowable outcomes of an 
increasingly volatile global economy (p. 1152), these challenges also confront market-
facing actors, yet remain under-explored and elusive in their theoretical significance.  
 
This pervasive theoretical emptiness of housebuilder behaviour in housing studies is 
troubling. It was the early work of Kaiser (1968), Kaiser & Weiss (1970), Tompkinson 
(1970), Fromm (1971) and Goldberg (1974) that first recognised the importance of 
developer behaviour, and the supply side more generally, in understanding residential 
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growth and urban spatial structures. Goldberg (1974) argued what was known about the 
supply side was largely macro / microeconomic (see Tompkinson, 1970), with little 
available on the organisational behaviour of residential developers, while Kaiser and 
Weiss (1970) argued that ╅┼if public policy was to be effective in guiding patterns of new 
urban growth, it must be based on a realistic understanding of the development process╆ 
(p. 30). While this early body of work recognised the functional importance of developers 
in promoting and understanding supply side factors, it did little to advance our 
theoretical and empirical understanding of developer behaviour or their role in housing 
supply constraints. Indeed, it seems inconceivable, as Goldberg (1974) himself 
emphasised over 40 years ago, that, despite the continuing central role played by 
housebuilders in the expansion of urban areas, little remains known about how they 
operate.  
 
This paper addresses this gap in knowledge. In it, I develop an analytical framework that 
positions housing market recovery as a turbulent institutional transition and apply this 
to an empirical investigation to evaluate whether Britain╆s biggest housebuilders have 
the institutional flexibility to increase housing output as the recovery phase takes hold. 
Using primary qualitative data from elite market actors, I investigate how Britain╆s 
biggest housebuilders adjusted their roles and organisational behaviours to their 
changing institutional environment. I employ a heuristic model to present three key 
phases that characterise the housebuilder transition through early to mid-recovery. The 
data produced shows how Britain╆s biggest housebuilders responded to significant 
institutional shock in their operating environment and reveals how this constrained 




What follows is a review of previous work on housing supply constraints, an overview of 
the theoretical considerations underpinning the analytical framework, details of the 
methodology and an overview of the results structured around a heuristic device. The 
paper is concluded with discussion and overview of the contribution to knowledge and 
recommendations for a future research agenda.  
 
Understanding housing supply constraints 
Understanding housing supply constraints has long been a focus for housing studies, ever 
since the prominent rise of ╅speculative╆ market-based housebuilders in the 1980s, and 
the corresponding retreat of the state from housing provider to enabler (Emms, 1990; 
Priemus, 1995). For over 4 decades, scholarly attention has focused on theorising the 
structure, characteristics and operation of housing markets, land markets (Barlow, 1993; 
Knoll et al., 2017), the development process (Gore and Nicholson, 1991; Guy and 
Henneberry, 2002), the efficacy of planning and public policy interventions and, more 
broadly, the state-market nexus (Barlow and King, 1992; Healey, 1992). This body of 
work has contributed to our understanding of what Whitehead and Williams (2011) 
consider to be a series of commonly agreed ╅fundamentals╆ that now characterise Britain╆s housing market, which include: a fiscal system favouring owner occupation; a 
highly deregulated finance market; a continuing problem of an inadequate supply 
response; and, volatility in house prices and market activity (p. 1158). These 
fundamentals have, over time, given primacy to economic theorisations and empirical 
observations that frequently frame the analysis of Britain╆s housing situation. These tend 
to be couched within the widely accepted link between housing systems and the 
macroeconomy (see Adams & Fuss, 2010; Leung, 2004; Nneji et al., 2013) and place 
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fiscally-oriented demand side measures centre stage in the formulation of policy 
responses to significant fluctuations in housing market activity (see Galster, 1997).  
Indeed, it is well known that short-term housing market volatility arises from 
macroeconomic volatility or changes in financial conditions, where house price inflation 
or deflation affects supply outcomes. To tackle this, Stephens (2011) argues for counter-
cyclical policies such as mortgage credit controls and reforms to the system of property 
taxation. However, from this dominant economic framing, the complexity of supply side 
characteristics and the supply-demand nexus more broadly, is often overlooked. In its 
place is usually a neoclassical expectation that a supply response is both inherent to 
demand side interventions and will yield appropriate housing production. This a priori 
supply response from demand-side stimuli hides the complexities of actor agency and 
organisational behaviour that has been shown in recent research to influence housing 
supply outcomes (Payne, 2015, 2013).   
So, what of this supply side? We know that housing market volatility and underlying 
inflationary pressures in the housing market are the continuing problem of an inadequate 
supply response in the British housing system (Stephens, 2011). Stephens (2011) further 
argues that to address this may require significant changes in the ╅structural╆ aspects of Britain╆s market-led housing system, namely spatial planning systems and land use 
controls, which have conventionally been shown to restrict housing supply in spite of 
earlier protestations that they merely ╅organise╆ the development of land (Grigson, 1986). 
This position is based on a series of influential studies undertaken by authors such as 
Cheshire and Shepard, (1989), Adair et al (1991), Evans (1991), Barlow (1993), Bramley 
(1993a, 1993b), Needham and Lie (1994), Monk & Whitehead (1996). This body of work 
has collectively emphasised how land use controls and planning systems place 
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restrictions on the housing land market, producing higher land costs (Evans, 1987) but 
without commensurate benefits (Monk and Whitehead, 1996) resulting in lowered 
profitability for speculative developers (Golland, 1996) thus constraining supply 
outcomes.  
 
Despite its value, this work is fundamentally premised on a series of intellectual leaps 
that characterise the developer response to these constraining factors, situated often 
within a mainstream neoclassical framing. What remains unanswered is how or why 
developers react to these structural effects on price or supply. Such is evident in the 
assertion of Monk and Whitehead (1996) in their attempt to understand why developers 
built too many tiny houses for the cheaper end of the housing market when faced with 
stiff competition in the land market in Fenland (pg. 420). Their conclusive assumption 
that ╅┼this question can only be addressed by models of oligopoly and risk╆ (ibid.) 
underplays what more recent research emphasises as the complex organisational 
decision-making processes that developers adopt in response to market dynamics and 
policy change (Payne and Barker, 2018, 2015; Payne, 2015, 2013).    
 
Whilst characterising supply side issues as a series of structural constraints does not 
necessarily undermine the agency of housing market actors, it does serve to highlight a 
longstanding tension between where scholarly attention sits in regard to understanding 
housing supply constraints and of the ontological status of structure and agency in 
conceiving housing market dynamics and the motivations of their constituent actors.  
Indeed, Monk and Whitehead (1996) conclude their paper with an argument that 
planners need to better understand the market, acknowledging that planning and the 
market interact in a much more complicated way than existing models predict, with a 
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particular under emphasis on bargaining and negotiation (p. 421). Yet, it remains the case 
that the influence and contribution of actor behaviour and organisational decision 
making in explaining housing supply outcomes remains a neglected aspect of research in 
housing studies.   
 
Some attempts have been made to address this gap, serving to emphasise a more 
disaggregated view of how housing systems operate and to understand the particularities 
of supply side activity. Such work is premised on the housing market being theoretically 
conceived not as a homogenous entity, but rather a social construction, where the 
heterogeneity of housing and real estate markets gives rise to investigations examining 
firm-level strategy within its broader institutional setting (Cars et al., 2002). Collectively, 
this body of work emphasizes the context, process and social relations of market activity 
and the distinctive routines, cultures, procedures and institutions evident in sub markets 
(Adams et al., 2005) rather than any theoretical end state (Oxley, 2004). In this sense, 
how market actors╆ behaviours and decisions are embedded in and sensitive to, 
institutions - in particular policy, economic and political change - provides the context for 
individual land-use decisions (Adams and Watkins, 2002). This is a theoretical and 
conceptual framing from which institutions matter. Notable recent examples include 
studies into the social and organisational networks of developers (Henneberry & Parris, 
2013) and the organisational behaviours and motivations of housebuilders and 
landowners (Adams and Payne, 2013; Adams et al., 2012; Adams et al., 1992; Payne, 
2015, 2013). These recent studies build upon earlier work by notable authors such as 
Healey (1991), Ball (1986, 1998, 1999), Guy and Henneberry (2000) and Cars et al. 




Despite having common theoretical and conceptual traits, there has been limited 
agreement in this literature over ways to define and apply the theories used to frame 
these empirical observations. Indeed, whilst the common ontological thread within this 
body of work is that institutions matter, the well-established and troublesome snags of 
institutionalism discussed below have undermined the efficacy and applicability of this 
theoretical perspective as a means of conceptualising behaviour and agency in market-
led housing systems and in examining housing supply constraints. This debate is 
unpacked further in the following section, where the value of institutional analysis is 
discussed and a framework for analysing housebuilder behaviour in a recovering housing 
market is presented.  
 
Theorisi  institutional transitions 
The intellectual pace of institutionalism as a theory for understanding change has 
quickened in recent years having suffered previously from conceptual slippage and 
confusion as to its precise definition and generic meaning (see Cumbers et al., 2003). 
While the persistent problems with institutional change theory are by no means resolved, 
the efficacy of institutionalism as a means of examining change across multiple social 
science disciplines is steadily growing.  
Jessop (2001) argues that institutions have been endorsed in the social sciences as an 
excellent entry point, even as a mediating role, for overcoming some of its well-
established and troublesome snags such as ╅┼ontological antinomies, epistemological 
dualisms, and methodological dilemmas╆ (p. 1215). Jessop (2001) suggests institutions 
matter ontologically because they are the primary axis of collective life and social order 
in that they define the rules and resources of social action, the opportunity structures and 
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constraints on behaviour and shape the way things are to be done (p. 1217). 
Methodologically, Jessop (2001) argues institutions provide the best entry point for 
understanding social life ╅┼even if the search for understanding is subsequently moved 
down towards microfoundations or up to emergent macrostructural phenomena╆ (p. 
1217).  
 
Despite a scattered body of literature, institutional change theory does coalesce around 
a core set of theoretical traits. Bathelt and Gluckler (2014) define institutions as ╅┼forms 
of ongoing and relatively stable patterns of social practice based on mutual expectations 
that owe their existence to either purposeful constitution or unintentional emergence (p. 
346). Scott (2010) reminds us that institutional processes and structures operate ╅┼from 
the most micro interpersonal level to the most macro transocietal level╆ (p. 5). In this 
sense, institutions develop ╅┼in relation to rules, in response to them, or even against them╆ (Bathelt and Gluckler, 2014, p. 346), where actors act according to certain goals, 
rationalities and purposes (ibid.) and are embedded in the structures of social relations 
that influence their actions and decisions (Granovetter, 1985). Institutional analysis thus 
involves examining the dynamic interaction between how particular organisations and 
actors operate and the wider relations of which they are a part. Applied spatially, an 
institutional approach emphasises the qualities of the wider milieux in which activity is 
performed and enables researchers to examine the differential capacity of organisations 
or locales in response to change (Cars et al., 2002).  
 
Institutional change theory is critical of the multiple variants of rationalist analysis, 
emphasising the social embeddedness of action (Willmott, 2015) and delivering ╅┼an 
antidote to analyses based on objectivist ontology that produce often mathematicised 
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analysis of objectivated outcomes╆ (Lawson, 2013 cited in Willmott 2015, p. 105). Indeed, 
mainstream economics╆ market-orientated analysis of real estate development processes 
and market-led housing systems more broadly, have in recent years been both challenged 
and supplanted by institutional perspectives and the complications of the real world 
emphasised (Oxley, 2004).       
 
While traditional notions of institutional change have been concerned with how firms 
reject old rules, learn new routines and develop new capabilities over time (Oliver, 1992), 
they more often than not focus on incrementalism and path dependency (see North, 
1991). The more recent concept of institutional transitions departs from these traditional 
notions of change and instead focuses on large scale shock and disturbance in the 
institutional environment and how this affects the strategic choices of firms (Li et al., 
2013; Peng, 2004, 2003). The central tenet of the institutional transitions thesis is 
presented by Peng (2003), whom defines institutional transitions as ╅┼fundamental and 
comprehensive changes introduced to the formal and informal rules of the game that 
affect organisations as players╆ (p. 275). In this sense, institutional shocks and transitions 
induce the need for a response to existing ways of doing things and thus raises questions 
over how and why institutions and organisations adapt or what may cause a lack of 
response.   
 
The institutional transitions thesis has primarily been developed and applied to emerging 
economies as a means of understanding and explaining rapid change relating to large 
scale shock and disturbance often resulting from political or economic instability (see 
Peng et al., 2008; Peng, 2004, 2003; Peng and Jiang, 2005). The thesis remains untested 
in an advanced economy setting and is notably absent from the housing studies literature. 
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Yet, it is conceivable that conceptualising the global financial crisis as a ╅shock╆ and the 
prevailing institutional change as a ╅transition╆ offers a significant opportunity to advance 
our understandings of housing supply constraints in market-led housing systems. Indeed, 
how housebuilding firms manoeuvre during such shocks and whether this constraints 
housing supply is a fundamental gap in our knowledge.  
 
Analytical Considerations    ╅Shocks╆ in real estate markets are those powerful and pervasive impacts from political 
or economic events that are beyond simple structural changes to the environment in 
which development occurs, such as planning policy or building technology (Barras, 1994, 
p. 195). Such shocks effectively force market actors into a response and lay challenge to 
conventional notions of incremental change and path dependency (North, 1991; Oliver 
1992). Theories of speculative residential development (see Barron, 1983; Barras, 1987, 
2009; Gore and Nicholson, 1991; Guthrie, 2010; Healey and Barratt, 1990; Kanemoto, 
1985; Markusen and Scheffman, 1978; Payne, 2015, 2013) reveal four ╅shocks╆ in the 
housing market that can disrupt the business operations of speculative housebuilders:  
ɐ Restrictions in mortgage availability, reducing effective demand; 
ɐ House price deflation, reducing gross development value of sites under 
construction or land owned; 
ɐ Restrictions in capital availability, limiting funds for speculative housebuilders╆ 
day-to-day business operations, including land purchase and existing work in 
progress; 
ɐ Reductions in new house sales, affecting cashflow and lengthening return on 




When taking a market-led housing system 1  as a specific institutional ensemble, 
housebuilding companies are market actors in pursuit of specific goals, where the impact 
of significant institutional shocks or turbulence is most obvious. Comparatively, 
institutions are the stabilisations or correlations of the interactions between individual 
and collective actors and thus associated with specific economic and social processes, not 
with specific outcomes or measurable characteristics (Bathelt and Gluckler, 2014). Thus, 
the analysis of an institutional transition focusing on the level of the actor/firm, rather 
than the level of the market or individual, enables empirical investigations that more 
explicitly link actor behaviour and motivations with analyses of housing outcomes.   
 
Drawing on these analytical considerations, the empirical study that follows is framed to 
examine how strategic choices by speculative housebuilders are made and changed 
during the institutional transition of housing market recovery to determine how this may 
be constraining housing supply and establish what influences may be had by housing 
policy in dealing with these challenges. The specific research questions are outlined in 
the methodology that follows. This analytical approach is used to yield new conceptual 
insights into how speculative housebuilders 'play the new game╆ of early housing market 
recovery, when the new rules may not be completely known or indeed, whether inertia 
exists as they wait for new institutional realities to be defined (Peng, 2003). These 
insights are then used to question whether we can predict the strategic choices made by 
                                                 
1Market-led housing systems, typically found in advanced economies, are those in which housing is predominantly 
developed and proffered by market actors as a privatized commodity with relative affordability and is supported by 
fiscal and other public policies with the purpose of promoting speculative development and home ownership. Under 
such a system, housing supply is subject to cyclicality in the wider economy and the contribution of state-level 
provision is typically secondary to that of the market. Owner occupation is often professed as the ideal tenure in 
market-led housing systems because it generally offers relative stability, security and certainty when compared to 
alternative tenures such as social rented, private rented or shared ownership.  
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speculative housebuilders during shock and transition and consider how decision 
making in one point in time may lead to change that will affect action in subsequent 
phases (Peng, 2003).   
 
Methodology 
The empirical research presented here set out to examine what changes volume and 
super2 speculative housebuilders - Britain╆s key delivery agents of new homes - made to 
their business behaviours since the onset of the recovery phase in the British housing 
market to consider how these institutionally constituted behaviours may be constraining 
new housing output. The aim of the empirical research was to critically evaluate whether 
volume and super British housebuilders have the institutional flexibility to increase 
housing output as the recovery phase matures. Three research questions framed the 
empirical investigation: 
1. What changes have volume and super housebuilders made to their business 
behaviours since the onset of the recovery phase in the housing market; 
2. To what extent are these institutionally-constituted behaviours constraining new 
housing output; and  
3. What policy measures might be necessary to increase development activity as 
housing market recovery matures to achieve the UK Government's housebuilding 
ambitions?  
The empirical research was undertaken between 2014 - 2015, five years after the British 
economy left recession and when national annual house price inflation demonstrated a 
                                                 
2 Volume builders produce 2,000–5,000 units per annum and super builders produce over 5,000 units per annum 




positive upward trend from the previous deflation of 2008, 2009 and 2011. The research 
consisted of two stages. Stage 1 targeted elite in-depth interviews with Managing 
Directors and Land Directors of volume and super housebuilders operating in the regions 
of Central Scotland and Northern England. This enabled the examination of housebuilder 
recovery behaviour in distinct institutional contexts. Interviews were secured with 
Managing Directors and Land Directors from 15 housebuilders in total and were 
conducted between September 2014 and February 2015.  
 
Stage 2 targeted elite in-depth qualitative interviews with CEOs and National Group 
Directors from the top 15 British housebuilders by turnover - who together produce 
approximately 50% of all new homes annually - to interrogate the recovery behaviours 
identified in Stage 1. Interviews were secured with CEOs and National Group Directors 
from 8 housebuilders and were conducted between April 2015 and June 2015. All 
interviews focused on examining: the impact of the recession on business strategy and 
culture; the character and key business phases of recovery; changes in land, construction, 
planning and marketing practices; policy and the role of government; solutions for 
increasing housing supply; and, industry resilience to future challenges.  
 
The interviews were transcribed and manually coded as an analytical, heuristic tactic 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). Three cycles of coding were undertaken to develop and 
reconfigure initial summative codes with longer passages of text into a set of descriptive 
codes to summarise and condense the data and generate themes. Repetitive patterns of 
behaviour and consistencies were used to establish the heuristic device that frames the 
results. Participants from both stages have been anonymised at their request to avoid 




Whilst the methodological approach has significant strengths in its recruitment of an 
otherwise elusive elite market actor, which addresses an empirical gap in the housing 
studies literature, it does have its limitations. The study presents one perspective of 
housebuilder behaviour centred on volume and super providers and therefore discounts 
the contribution of SMEs and other housing providers to an understanding of housing 
supply constraints. The research also focuses wholly on the market perspective. Whilst it 
is not the purpose of the paper to investigate the state╆s perspective on housing supply 
constraints, the research does initiate an interest set of questions on the complexity of 
state-market relations in housing supply and opens up avenues for future research. These 
will be addressed in the discussion.      
 
The results presented in the next section are arranged around a heuristic device that 
characterises how British housebuilders responded and adapted to the turbulent and 
transitionary nature of housing market recovery. The heuristic device acts as a measure 
of recovery from the perspective of housebuilder behaviour and does not provide any 
quantitative indicators nor does it seek to comprehensively offer a view on what drives 
what happens during the wider institutional transition (i.e. an explanation of institutional 
change per se). The common trajectories evident in the interview data enabled three key 
phases to be identified, even if some differences in individual developer behaviours were 
evident or that different firms faced different institutional pressures. There are no 
specific time scales attached to the transition depicted as it is not a time related process 
(Peng, 2003) and there were no significant temporal benchmarks or brackets for 
organisational transformation made obvious during the interviews. However, the phases 
do have a temporal dimension in order to reduce the generalizability of propositions 
 
16 
across time (Peng, 2003). They depict the common institutional characteristics that 
demarcate how housebuilders responded to the changing institutional context of 
speculative residential development in the post-recession environment. Some comment 
is made as to what housebuilders indicate as factors worthy of mention in driving a shift 
between the phases. The data from Group Directors and CEOs offers a strategic 
perspective of business behaviours whilst the divisional interview data elucidates how 
these strategies played out regionally. Where distinct differences emerged in the Scottish 
and English approaches, these are acknowledged.  
 
Results - The Three Phases  Recovery 
The results below are arranged around the following three transitionary phases of 
recovery - the investment phase, the delivery phase and the growth phase. These three 
phases depict the common trajectories that housebuilders elucidated in the interviews 
and act as a measure of recovery from the perspective of housebuilder behaviour. What 
follows below is the first phase of recovery behaviour - the investment phase - offering 
insights into how housebuilders reconditioned their behaviours as the green shoots of 
recovery emerged in Britain's housing market. During the interviews, housebuilders 
noted a range of indicators that signalled the ╅start╆ of recovery in the housing market 
including volume and rate of house sales, price inflation, forward sales, using less 
incentives, increasing employment rates, growing land market competition, revenue 
growth and active land marketing, as one Scottish Divisional Managing Director neatly 
outlined ╉┼sales becoming easier and land becoming harder to get, they╆ve just swapped 
round the other way from what they actually were╊.   
 
The Investment Phase - cautionary reconditioning and cash recovery 
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During the formative stages of housing market recovery, housebuilders revealed a much 
more cautious and diligent approach to investment than their self-proclaimed fervent 
boom phase behaviours of pre-recession, where volume output had been their primary 
driver of business activity (Payne, 2015). Most housebuilders found themselves still 
highly geared as a result of pre-recession lending, with a lot of bank debt despite 
significant write downs. Builders were thus concerned at this time with generating cash 
to reinvest into their businesses. For some, this meant raising cash through rights issues, 
whilst others focused on operationalising strategic land to develop at current market 
values and better margins. Each builder╆s approach in this phase was dependent on the 
peculiarities of their recessionary experience and financial status coming into recovery.   
 
At the Group level, some housebuilders who had strategically chosen to invest significant 
sums of cash in the land market during the recession, in place of paying dividends to 
shareholders, had been able to take advantage of record low land prices and began 
building these sites out at better margins to generate cash return, as one Group Land 
Director noted: 
 ╉┼because we could see that land at that time was at a once in a 
generation low price┼even though we were in terrible shape as an 
industry, we believed in our long-term future and our 
shareholders accepted our arguments that you know, the long-
term benefits of getting land in now at these prices will pay off╊┻    
 
Elsewhere, other housebuilders managed income streams in different ways to create cash 
with which to invest. Some induced sales on existing development sites by becoming 
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second charge lenders and offering deposits to lure purchasers, whilst others built ╅on-
spec' for forward delivery to the private rented sector.  
 
For day-to-day divisional operations, this ╅cash is king' mentality manifested in two key 
behaviours during the investment phase. First, for existing and planned construction 
programmes, was the shrewd management of work in progress (WIP), particularly for 
sites subjected to price deflation and margin squeeze by the recession, as one Scottish 
Divisional Managing Director noted:  
 ╉┼unsold WIP on any site is controlled at £750,000 per 
site┼ what we╆ve done is basically ensured that the Sales 
Team and the Construction Team are talking all the time. 
So if the Construction Team are building Plot 17, the Sales 
Team are selling Plot 17, They╆re not selling Plot 21 or Plot にの╊  
 
Second, for new land investment opportunities, a more measured and discerning site 
selection process was enacted, with efficient capital return a primary decision-making 
factor. This ╅de-risking╆ process meant builders active in the land market during this 
phase largely avoided sites requiring significant upfront costs or inefficient capital lock 
up, such as those with large scale infrastructure requirements, complex ground 
conditions, or planning risk ╉┼so when we╆re looking at new sites you know, if there was 





A degree of variance was evident among housebuilders in their attitude toward risk-
taking and their individual ways of de-risking land during the investment phase. In the 
above case, the developer was unwilling to purchase sites with upfront capital spend, 
whereas below, another Group Land Director explained how their organisation focused 
on the better processing of risk to accommodate such challenges: 
 ╉┼derisking is also about deferred payments┼ if we have to build a 
new roundabout, can that be after 500 units rather than after 
five?... So it╆s not getting rid of risk, it╆s just making sure it╆s 
processed properly╊┻   
  
This steely focus on de-risking, efficient return on capital employed and controlling work 
in progress was enabled by new group wide management and reporting systems, where 
Group Directors, and in some cases the CEO personally, could keep tighter reigns on 
divisional activity, as one Group Land Director noted: 
 ╉┼I can see who is spending what, where, when and what 
disciplines we╆re spending it on, how we are going to forecast 
against budget and where the kind of red lights are blinking and 
address it╊. 
 
This greater ╅interference╆ by Group on the day to day activities of divisional offices 
shaped their land acquisition strategies by reducing flexibility and, in some cases, driving 




╉It╆s all about rate of return as well, that╆s why it had to meet the 
group margins whereas before there was flexibility and you could 
have a plan to get back in a very competitive market to your 
standard rates for purchase. We then had to have them [margins] 
at day one, sometimes with even additional margin there because 
there was risks to cover. So we had cover built in which just drove 
land values down┼╊┻ 
 
When discussing this observation with that Division╆s Group Land Director, he quipped: 
 ╉Guilty┿┼ I think mostly though they grumble like hell┼ deep down 
I think they╆re happier that we are a much more disciplined and 
rigorous company on land acquisitions now╊┻   
 
The perspicuous focus by housebuilders during the investment phase on return on 
capital employed enabled them to reinvest capital in their businesses in such a way as to 
generate ╅high reach╆┸ increasing returns, increasing revenue and increasing margins. 
This paved the way for transition to increasing delivery and growth, as one CEO stated: 
 ╉So the land bank╆s getting better spread and much bigger to create 
the capacity for the future growth. And with that comes ever-
increasing return on capital employed for the time being because 
the more capital you put to use efficiently then the higher the 
returns, the higher the revenue and therefore you become a more 




For divisions, this perspicuous focus influenced builders╆ spatial preferences for land 
acquisition, since targeting more stable housing markets and producing traditional 
family homes offered the lure of margin stability, relatively better cost and value 
predictability and more secure return on capital prospects. Those non-market locations 
exhibiting price volatility or comparatively poor price inflation were largely avoided.   
 
The investment phase was characterised by a housebuilding industry diligently using 
conventional business strategies to secure cash return and maximise return on capital. 
Rather than developing new capabilities and restructuring their businesses, 
housebuilders drew on existing organisational routines and repertoires (Peng, 2000) and 
refined their approach to deal with the institutional upheaval they faced. They sought to 
align their conventional business strategies to the transitory institutional environment 
to achieve strategic fit and keep a level of business performance to secure their survival 
during the early recovery.   
 
The Delivery Phase - stability and margin recovery 
The early recovery behaviours discussed above, with their steely focus on capital return 
and cost minimisation, enabled housebuilders to achieve margin recovery, yield a 
strengthening stability to their return on investment and make onward progress towards 
business expansion. This enabled housebuilders to shift from the investment phase to a 
period of housing delivery, where post-recession land investment was beginning to 
deliver better margins and return on capital figures, enabling further land investment 
and increased output. For divisions, this translated into a clear and growing pressure 
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from Group to convert this investment into results, as one Scottish Divisional Managing 
Director noted:  
 ╉we╆re buying sites now with better margins, so we╆re seeing 
margin growth recovery┼ you╆re probably seeing return on capital 
figures getting better because you╆re churning through the sites 
faster and your premiums are not growing┼ now Group are saying 
well I actually think you should be back up the upwards slope and 
pushing up the results╊ 
  
However, most divisions noted a distinct caution in the early part of this delivery phase 
to pushing results too fast. Most spoke of finding the sweet spot between pushing prices 
in line with price inflation and demand but achieving the sales rates necessary to secure 
return on capital and margin, as another Scottish Divisional Managing Director noted: 
 ╉So there╆s that stability that engenders that sort of recovery┼ it 
does still ebb and flow a little bit, so it is a fragile recovery because 
if we push prices too hard it slows immediately╊┻  
 
All housebuilders agreed that the delivery phase (and to a certain extent the investment 
phase preceding it) was stimulated to a significant degree by the Government╆s Help to 
Buy3 policy - a mechanism for stimulating demand - for which they were unanimously 
                                                 
3 Help to Buy (see https://www.helptobuy.gov.uk) was introduced by HM Government in 2013 as a programme 
to help first time buyers and those looking to move home or purchase residential property. The programme has 
various interventions. The most relevant is the equity loan. This sees the buyer contribute a 5% deposit which is 
topped up by a Government equity loan of 20% of the property value (40% within London). It is available for 
only new builds under £600,000 in England and £300,000 in Wales. The loan is interest free for the first 5 years.       
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positive. Help to Buy enabled builders to more confidently commit to construction 
programmes, increase sales rates projections, reduce their reliance on inducements such 
as part exchange, better manage work in progress, predict future cash flows and 
maximise land values to secure more development sites. The policy provided builders 
with confidence and opportunity to transition from investment to delivery and increase 
the amount of housebuilding.  
 
This confidence appeared to reach landowners too, who housebuilders revealed started 
to add financial pressure to maximise land values. In Scotland, one particular Divisional 
Managing Director commented on the emergence of contract obligations to maximise 
land value when appraising development sites: 
 ╉┼anything that was negotiable was negotiated to the N╆th degree┼ landowners would chase every penny. So a lot of 
contracts you╆d have an obligation to maximise value. So 
landowners would┼ say well I think you can design the site a 
different way that╆s cheaper; prove you haven╆t considered it╊┻  
 
During the delivery phase and despite emerging house price inflation, builders noted two 
key recovery constraints that affected their ability to step up housebuilding rates and 
respond to the relatively increasing demand. Whilst these were differentially felt 
depending on location (England and Scotland), they did coalesce around two noteworthy 
points. First was the lack and increasing cost of skilled labour and materials, which 
reduced the net gain from post-recession house price inflation and frustrated site starts 
and construction management, as one Scottish Divisional Managing Director noted:  
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 ╉So where you see all these things saying house prices went up 
10%; yeah, but bricklayers actually went up 9% in cost. It doesn╆t 
seem like a big thing but the industry is absolutely dying on its feet 
for bricklayers and bricks. Now we can╆t actually do our job 
because there╆s a lack of materials and there╆s a lack of labour and 
the cost of what you can get is extortionate╊┻  
 
Second, site start delays appeared as a particularly frustrating constraint noted by all 
housebuilders during the delivery phase, which impeded their ability to ╅get on╆ with 
increasing housing output. The delays in local planning authorities discharging planning 
conditions were, housebuilders felt, down to a lack of resources and a symptom of the 
austerity cuts made by central government during the financial crisis. Housebuilders 
responded to this by increasing the spread and range of housing sites to maintain 
production and delivery rates, as one Scottish Divisional Managing Director noted:  
 ╉┼ you cannot predict how long it╆s going to take to get on-site, it╆s 
really, really hard.  And therefore it╆s hard to predict what your profit╆s going to be; that╆s why you need more sites, so you can ┼ 
you can balance them off against each other┼ if one site slows 
down we can speed another one up to fill its place╊┻ 
 
Related, housebuilders also noted their general struggles in the time it took to deal with 
local authority planning departments in terms of pre-application discussions and the 
processing of planning applications. This again, they felt, was down to the lack of financial 
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and labour resources in planning departments, with most housebuilders commenting on 
the loss of experienced planners who had retired during the financial crisis that were 
either not replaced or replaced by less experienced planners.   
 
The delivery phase revealed a speculative housebuilding industry stuck to established 
practices rather than embracing new ways of doing business to overcome the constraints 
they faced in the post-shock context. Housebuilders╆ short-term reactions to shock and 
the resilience of their long-term behaviours to transitions raises questions about whether 
these constraints may continue to prevail if housebuilders do not restructure or develop 
new market-based capabilities, unlearn existing organisational routines, or search for 
new competitive advantage (Peng, 2003). This issue will be returned to in the discussion.    
 
The Growth Phase - resilience and controlled growth 
Beyond the delivery phase, a number of housebuilders were beginning to grow their 
businesses through two means: 1) buying more land and opening more outlets4 and 2) 
enhancing divisional capacity. They noted the key drivers of this growth as being 
increasing sales rates, price inflation and relatively low interest rates, in addition to Help 
to Buy and the NPPF5, which were cited as two particular policy measures supporting 
such growth. How housebuilders sought to achieve this growth depended on their 
regional and spatial ambitions in regard to their target land and housing markets. One 
                                                 
4 An outlet is a ╅shop front╆ - a site with an active construction programme and new homes marketed for sale. Bigger 
housing development sites in multiple ownership with multiple housebuilders constructing homes will have multiple 
competing outlets.   
5 The National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF, 2012) for England and Wales introduced a clear requirement for 
local authorities to keep development plans up to date to ensure a deliverable 5 year land supply, with a ╅presumption in favour of sustainable development╆ to enable development if this clear requirement was not met. 




CEO noted the logic of outlet expansion as a primary driver of business growth, 
highlighting market absorption rates as a key impediment to divisional output growth: 
 ╉The only way you grow a housebuilder though is to have more 
outlets. You cannot say to these guys ╅Can you squeeze out more 
from your existing sites╂╆┸ you╆ve got to create the ability to grow 
the number of sites. Because there is a sales rate in the industry, 
depending where you are┼ on average it╆s about 0.65 for the 
country. So actually that sets your bar┼It╆s about 30-35 private 
houses a year per site┼ And therefore if you want to have a 
thousand units per division, you╆ve got to have 20 sites╊┻ 
 
Most CEO╆s and Group Directors spoke of plans to reopen regional divisions closed during 
the recession. Some had created embryonic divisions in which they were buying land 
with a view to starting up business in the coming years. Like the investment phase, most 
housebuilders continued to target stable housing markets, in place of those with low or 
volatile price inflation because of the lure of margin stability, relatively better cost and 
value predictability and more secure return on capital prospects. Other builders spoke of 
splitting up existing divisions to facilitate business expansion and increase development 
rates, as one Group Director explained: 
 ╉┼there is a kind of natural limit of how many units an office can 
deliver without sort of really badly creaking at the seams┼ The 
way you build extra capacity is really by having more offices, in 
areas where you have more confidence. And you╆ll be building 
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there already, it╆s just about┼ reducing the operator footprint of 
each office by appointing another╊┻  
 
These strategies led housebuilders to focus on acquiring a range and spread of land 
investments across their divisional areas rather than increasing build out rates on 
existing sites or developing on a few very large sites, as one CEO commented ╉If you buy 
a lot of land on a hundred sites, then you╆ve got a hundred shop fronts╊┻ From a Divisional 
perspective, delivering such growth based on adherence to earlier investment and 
delivery phase behaviours of ╉┼controlling our work in progress, making sure our capital 
lock-up is sensible and measured and not exposing our business to too much risk╊, as one 
English Divisional Managing Director commented, as well as increasing the number of 
outlets to meet growing delivery aspirations. However, divisions remained cautious 
about overextending resources in response to Group visions for growth, as one Scottish 
Divisional Managing Director noted: 
 ╉So we╆re currently trying to increase the number of outlets and 
our sales rate to meet those aspirations. You know, in a perfect 
world we╆d have 20 outlets doing 30 a year, 600 units with full 
margin ┼ And so we╆re building the business back up, we have the 
capacity to do 600/650, with no real aspiration to drive it beyond 
that because I think that╆s when things start to creak┻╊ 
 
Beyond these internal business strategies and plans for growth, housebuilders revealed 
a significant list of ╅recovery constraints╆ they argued were affecting their prospects to 
increase housing delivery under current institutional arrangements and were likely to 
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continue as housing market recovery matured. First, housebuilders were nervous of a ╅false spike╆ in demand created by Help to Buy and were cautious to rely on it as a means 
of continued growth. Scottish housebuilders in particular faced less certainty over the 
longer-term Government commitment to the scheme and were more nervous of the 
market dampening if it were to be cancelled and were keen to get use to life without it. 
Comparatively, for the English housebuilders, where Help to Buy faced a more certain 
future, the policy remained a very positive intervention during the growth phase.     
 
Second, housebuilders unanimously cited planning delays as a worsening constraint. The 
speed at which housebuilders were beginning to ╅churn through land╆┸ when compared 
to earlier in the recovery, was compounding this existing constraint. Housebuilders also 
cited the politics of planning, the poor understanding of development economics by 
elected members and the short-termism of policy making as additional frustrations 
impeding housing output. Despite the comparatively more positive policy picture painted 
by the English builders regarding the NPPF (DCLG, 2012), the Scottish builders noted a 
growing difficulty in getting quality planning permissions, when compared to two or 
three years before, a fact they put down to local authority perceptions of recovery and 
margin growth and a clamour for developer contributions.  
 
Third, housebuilders continued to experience skills and materials shortages as with the 
growth phase, which now was beginning to compound in impact delivery rates, despite 
the upward trend in house price inflation and demand. One English Divisional Managing 
Director spoke candidly about their growing worry over the skills shortage and their 
plans for ╉┼ modular roof construction, bathroom pods, kitchen pods, which are 
manufactured and constructed in factory-controlled environments and then delivered to 
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site as a finished article╊ as possible solutions in the future. Finally, most housebuilders 
noted mortgage lending constraints as impending greater volume delivery, though this 
was in part eased by Help to Buy and historically low interest rates, both somewhat 
cushioning the blow. 
 
The growth phase shows how housebuilders continued to take refuge in their 
conventional strategies to navigate through the recovering housing market and were able 
to sustain their competitive advantage by investing capital in land and development 
activity in well-known housing markets, where price stability offered a more secure 
prospect for margin growth. It also revealed the underlying sources of institutional 
pressure that constrained their ability to increasing housing supply and their ambitions 
for further growth.  
 
Table 1: Summary - The Three Phases of Recovery 
Phase Key Characteristics  
Investment  Focus on return on capital employed (ROCE) 
 Generating cash to reinvest in the business through inducing sales, 
rights issues and operationalising strategic land 
 Managing work in progress (WIP) to avoid significant capital lock 
up 
 De-risking new land investments by avoiding significant upfront 
costs, inefficient capital lock up, challenging ground conditions or 
planning risk 
 Spatial preference for stable housing markets and avoidance of 
price volatile non-market locations 
 Product preference for traditional family homes instead of flats to 
more efficiently manage WIP 
Delivery  Focus on margin growth and continuing focus on ROCE 
 Increasing spread and range of housing sites to maintain 
production 




 Lack of skilled labour and materials with associated cost increases 




 Increasing the range and spread of land investments 
 Opening more outlets to drive sales rates 
 Opening up divisional / regional offices to facilitate business 
expansion  
 Continuing focus on stable housing markets exhibiting steady price 
inflation. Avoidance of volatile housing markets 
 Worsening planning delays and perceived obstruction by elected 
members with poor understanding of development economics 
 Worsening skills and materials shortages 




This paper has presented an analysis of how Britain╆s biggest housebuilders responded 
to significant institutional shock in their operating environment caused by the 
vicissitudes and volatilities of housing market cyclicality. Using an analytical framework 
informed by an institutional transitions thesis, it has been shown how British 
housebuilding firms were, ultimately, able to survive the recession and grow their 
businesses, albeit at different rates and through different means, by adopting strategies 
focused on the three phases of investment, growth and delivery. The research has 
revealed a series of recovery constraints that housebuilders argued impeded growth, yet 
has also presented a picture of a speculative housebuilding industry stuck to established 
practices (see North, 1991) rather than embracing new ways of doing business to 
overcome these constraints in the post-shock context.   
 
In doing so, the paper provides an empirical advancement to the housing studies 
literature by capturing the otherwise elusive behaviours, motivations and attitudes of 
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speculative housebuilders. It also provides new data on how housing supply is 
constrained in the post-recession context and offers a conceptual advancement to 
existing understandings of both housebuilder behaviour and housing supply. This 
addresses two significant knowledge gaps in the housing studies literature and has 
international relevance to market-led housing systems around the globe where private 
provision forms a dominant feature of housing supply. The research also draws attention 
to the efficacy of taking an institutional perspective to conceptualise market-led housing 
systems and their supply characteristics. Indeed, the use of an institutional transitions 
thesis to frame the empirical investigation elucidates the complexity and nuance of the 
supply side response by market actor that is otherwise missing from conceptualisations 
of housing supply constraints.   
 
Research Reflections 
Despite a fundamental change in the housing and finance markets caused by the global 
financial crisis, British housebuilding firms were, ultimately, able to survive the recession 
and grow their businesses, albeit at different rates and through different means, by 
adopting strategies focused on the three phases of investment, growth and delivery. In 
some ways, it could be argued that housebuilding firms did not need to develop 
significantly new or fundamentally different capabilities to deal with such perverse and 
powerful shock, since policy measures aimed at stimulating demand such as Help to Buy 
removed some of the heat of the recession. Indeed, much of the criticism levied at Help to 
Buy centres on its artificial inflation of house prices, the corresponding increase in 
revenue and profits of speculative housebuilders and the overall reduction in housing 
affordability with little guarantee of overall increases in supply. Arguably, this policy 
approach enabled housebuilders to largely carry on as normal with their conventional 
 
32 
land acquisition and construction efficiency strategies (Payne, 2013, 2015) by making 
some adjustments to the spread and range of housing sites acquired and focusing new 
development in ╅safer╆ housing markets. In this sense, it could be argued that recovery 
was policy-induced and not market-led, with supply being underwritten to some extent 
by the Government. The unintended consequences of this style of policy intervention and 
its suitability during the early recovery phase as a means of easing supply constraints are 
worthy of critical reflection in future episodes of market turbulence.  
 Housebuilders╆ strategies could be interpreted as a rational choice given the bewildering 
and turbulent institutional environment they faced. Indeed, when the rules of the game 
are highly uncertain, many organisations will be unable to develop new capabilities and 
so will virtually by default continue to carry out much the same activities in similar ways 
as before (Peng, 2000, p. 145).  In this sense, housebuilders successfully aligned their 
conventional business strategies to the transitory institutional environment, achieving 
strategic fit and keeping a level of business performance that secured their survival 
during recession and their growth during recovery. Whereas Payne (2015) presented 
some evidence of housebuilders ╅unlearning╆ their fervent, pre-recessionary behaviours 
in early recession, this research shows evidence of an industry diligently using 
conventional business strategies to maximise return on capital. In this sense, rather than 
developing new capabilities and restructuring their businesses, housebuilders drew on 
existing organisational routines and repertoires (Peng, 2000) and refined their approach 
to deal with the institutional upheaval they faced. Some may argue housebuilders 
strengthened and leveraged existing ties with Government to secure a more comfortable 
economic and policy environment in which to respond to such upheaval. Whether 
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housebuilders have a better ╅fit╆ with the pre-transition institutional context is open to 
question.  
 
The extent and permanency of the recovery constraints identified by housebuilders 
during the research is unknown, but it is likely to require continuous effort by 
housebuilders and other incumbent actors to address multiple divergent demands and 
achieve longer term success (Smith and Lewis, 2011). This raises questions over whether 
policy makers and the housebuilders themselves have failed to appreciate that 
institutional change may make their previous fit with the institutional environment 
obsolete under the new circumstances. In this sense, the ╅recovery constraints╆ faced by 
housebuilders may prevail unless they restructure and develop new market-based 
capabilities, unlearn existing organisational routines, or search for new competitive 
advantage (Peng, 2003). Indeed, a housebuilding industry where ╅recovery╆ business 
strategies focus on efficient capital return and not volume output will have significant 
consequences for housing supply in the short to medium term. 
 
Yet, housebuilders may simply be waiting for new institutional realities to emerge and, 
in doing so, exhibiting a level of institutional inertia that reflects this ╅business as usual╆ 
approach. Despite the research showing housebuilders transitioning from a period of 
investment and delivery to business growth, housebuilders remained cautious and 
targeted such growth in areas exhibiting stability in price inflation and demand. For those 
markets where recovery was less pronounced or which took longer to play out, a level of 




What might the state╆s perception or expectations of the transition be? It is clear 
housebuilders benefited greatly from demand-side stimulus and a more development-
friendly policy framework, more so in the English than the Scottish context. Some may 
argue these interventions to be reflective of neoliberal political arrangements designed 
to enable market driven change more freely. The expectation then, that housebuilders 
will reciprocate with increasing production rates, is a tempting proposition. However, as 
this research has shown, the driving forces behind speculative development activity in 
the early recovery phase was not the result solely of demand stimulus or policies in 
presumption of development, but rather, of a complex set of business strategies, shaped 
by the transitory institutional environment. 
 
Whether there is common understanding and congruence between state expectation and 
market behaviour remains to be seen and should be the topic of future research. Indeed, 
where this research revealed under resourced planning departments and skills and 
materials shortages as ╅recovery constraints╆ impeding growth, it also revealed a 
speculative housebuilding industry stuck to established practices rather than embracing 
new ways of doing business to overcome these constraints in the post-shock context. This 
may go some way to explaining why post-recession housebuilding numbers remained 
low in spite of demand-side interventions and recovering prices. Such offers some insight 
into housebuilders╆ short-term reactions to shock and the resilience of their long-term 
behaviours to transitions. It also elucidates the complex interplay between structural 
recovery constraints and actor behaviour in explaining housing supply constraints in the 




Barras (1994) argues the complexity of building cycles illustrates the conundrum facing 
developers and points to why it is facile to simply ask them to learn from past mistakes - 
the most difficult problem they face is not to anticipate future demand (which research 
and policy interventions can help with) but to anticipate the reaction of their competitors 
to the same demand signals (which research and policy interventions cannot help) (p, 
196). In this sense, the development of longer-term resilience through short term 
transitions points not to a focus on demand stimulus, but rather, to a more detailed 
understanding of how housebuilders compete. Previous research tells us that 
housebuilders compete not in the housing market, but rather, in the land market (Payne 
2015, 2013), through the control and acquisition of their raw material and the 
minimisation of cost and risk thereafter through construction efficiency. As such, the 
sharing of capabilities between the state and the market in the post-recession context to 
speed up housing supply, if based on demand sitmulus rather than increasing the flow of 
development land, is likely to yield investment and delivery but not sustained growth. 
 
Looking Ahead 
What is the legacy of recovery and how might housebuilders better prepare for future 
institutional shocks in their operating environment? To some extent, housebuilders╆ 
recovery behaviours imply industry stability to future economic shocks - the research has 
revealed a diligent and cautious housebuilding industry focused on efficient return on 
capital employed rather than pushing volume output. This was arguably enabled by Help 
to Buy. Housebuilders might be tempted to stay in this recovery way of behaving for 
longer, as a way of shielding themselves from ongoing recovery constraints in their 
operating environment and better deal with a future collapse in demand. Such an 
instance would likely require policy change to further stimulate development or build 
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capacity in the market. Whether the private sector is willing and able to step back into 
the role of risk taking remains unknown. Some may argue the industry to be 
institutionally ╅stuck╆┸ locked into old ways of generating revenue and profit but without 
the corresponding volume output. Others may criticise the Government for artificially 
underwriting the housing market through Help to Buy. Nonetheless, the effect on housing 
supply under this scenario could be detrimental and points to the policy limitations of an 
over reliance on speculative housebuilding as a key delivery vehicle of housing policy.  
 
How might policy makers better facilitate housing growth in the early recovery phase? 
The British example has shown how the complex institutional arrangements emerging 
out of recession-induced shock to Britain╆s housing market presented housebuilders with 
a turbulent business environment and a series of recovery constraints impeding growth. 
While policy makers sought to stimulate demand as a means of encouraging supply, they 
overlooked the deeply intrenched and pervasive business practices of housebuilders, 
focused on assimilating risk through outlet expansion in stable housing markets and 
efficient return on capital. Whilst demand stimulus undoubtedly helped housebuilders 
generate revenue to reinvest and increase supply, this spike in development activity 
placed significant pressure on planning departments and skills and materials suppliers. Housebuilders╆ propensity for growth through outlet expansion will likely mean that 
planning authorities have to process applications on a greater spread of housing sites and 
that land markets will become more competitive, with a potential for land price inflation, 
particularly where housing land is restricted in areas of high demand. Policy measures 
that increase funding to local planning authorities, require elected officials to have a 
better understanding of development economics and require local planning authorities 
to allocate a greater spread of housing land, discouraging the use of only very large sites, 
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will go some way to addressing these constraints. Other policies that inject competition 
into the land market, through use it or lose it powers, and encourage landowners to 
release land for housing development, through vacant land levy, will also ease these 
recovery constraints. Wider industry programmes to address skilled labour and material 
shortages would be equally beneficial.  
 
Concluding Comments 
The research has revealed how Britain╆s biggest housebuilding companies managed to 
assimilate the pervasive aspects of a turbulent development context by devoting 
considerable resources to de-risking land purchases, controlling work in progress, 
minimising upfront capital expenditure and maximising efficient return on capital 
employed. Housebuilders took refuge in these strategies to navigate through the 
recovering housing market and were able to sustain their competitive advantage by 
investing capital in land and development activity in well-known housing markets, where 
price stability offered a more secure prospect for margin growth. Housebuilders did face 
some underlying sources of institutional pressure during the delivery and growth phases 
that constrained their ability to increasing housing supply and their ambitions for further 
growth.  
 
Drawing on this contribution to knowledge, how may we open up space for housebuilder 
behaviour to be different or take a transformative approach to achieve change in market-
led housing systems in the 21st century? The fundamental question remains, if policy 
makers don╆t initiate change, will housebuilders go it alone, especially if the environment 
is risky and disruptive? This research shows in the British context how housebuilders 
were institutionally stuck into old ways of doing things, which ultimately, was enabled by 
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significant government intervention stimulating market demand. This indicates that, in 
future episodes of extreme market cyclicality, this ╅rigid╆ system may not be able to 
correct itself and will be dependent on public action to ensure private sector housing 
output. In this sense, transformation may fall into the remit public policy intervention 
before market behaviour, to secure housing supply outcomes. Such points to the tense 
and somewhat problematic relationship between the state and the market in housing 
supply. State theorists should look to (re)examine the regulatory logic of state actors in 
housing supply and develop a future research agenda encompassing the dynamic 
relations between the state and the market in market-led housing systems to critically 
evaluate how current regulatory logics may impede market provision.     
 
Finally, what can the findings of the particularities of this institutional transition, with its 
dominant economic and financial framing, tell us about how housebuilders may respond 
to other institutional shocks or in different international settings? In the British case, 
housebuilders demonstrated a doubling down of their conventional business strategies 
around land acquisition, construction efficiency and return on capital. Such elucidates the 
fundamental role of risk management in the model of speculative housing provision, and 
market-led housing systems more broadly. Housing scholars should therefore consider 
the risk appetite and risk profiles of speculative housebuilders when undertaking 
comparative research to account for how housebuilders may better insulate themselves 
to future institutional shock and how policy makers may better secure their housing 
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